Abstract：For the reverse supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and two competitive retailers,on the premise that retailers' cost information is asymmetric,we use signal screening and Principal-Agent Theory to explore incentive contracts that manufacturer offers in three situations such as when government does not participate in reverse supply chain operation,when government implements reward policy to the manufacturer and when government implements reward policy to retailers.The results of the study show that:as retailers' competing degree increases,the commission rates that the manufacturer provides decrease while the overall revenue of the reverse supply chain increases;under the condition that two kinds of rewards strength is equal,when government implements reward policy to manufacturer,the overall revenue of reverse supply chain reaches maximum.
贡文伟, 刘坪, 李锦飞. 不完全信息下逆向供应链激励机制研究[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2014(6): 128-134.
Gong Wenwei, Liu Ping, Li Jinfei. Study on the Incentive Mechanism in Reverse Supply Chain with Asymmetric. , 2014(6): 128-134.
2014, 
