Abstract：A pollution reduction incentive model is built by applying the Mechanism Design Theory,in which the pollution reduction technology and effort level are both private information of enterprise.A pooling incentive contract and a separating incentive contract are respectively designed,and the parameters of two contracts are analyzed and numeral simulated.It turns out that the enterprise which owns low level pollution reduction technology gets reservation payoff all the time and the enterprise which owns high level pollution reduction technology can get extra payoff.Government prefers to adopt separating incentive contract.Enterprise which owns high level pollution reduction technology prefers the pooling incentive contract.The separating incentive contract goes against improving the pollution reduction technology of enterprise.Finally,according to the results,proper decision suggestions are proposed for government
杜建国,崔乾坤,张靖泉. 双重信息不对称下企业污染减排激励契约研究[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2015(12): 87-93.
Du Jianguo,Cui Qiankun,Zhang Jingquan. Incentive Contract for Enterprise's Pollution Reduction under the Framework of Dual Asymmetric Information. , 2015(12): 87-93.
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