Abstract：Based on the classic“Clever Pig Game”model,it divided government incentives on enterprise technology innovation into six kinds according to process of technological innovation.Adopting the method of combining static and dynamic game,the mechanism of government incentives for technological innovation is explored.The study shows that the direct government subsidies and tax return can increase the level of technological innovation of enterprises,but it will result in the waste of social costs and harming social welfare.Secondly,the government purchasing and industry-university-research institute cooperation can promote social welfare,but the incremental profit of the enterprise in the latter is significantly less than the incremental profits under government purchases.Again,preferential financing policies,“the government's protection of intellectual property rights gold + Fixed authorization”,“the government's protection of intellectual property rights gold + units authorized”can not only achieve the optimal level of technological innovation,but also can achieve Pareto optimal.Finally,the equilibrium profit of large enterprises under“the government's protection of intellectual property rights gold + units authorized”is greater than that of the premium fixed income equalization license profits.While the equilibrium profit of small enterprises under“the government's protection of intellectual property rights gold + Fixed authorization”is greater than that of unit royalty license profits
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