Abstract：Regarding the situation that low-carbon technology and effort level are both enterprise's private information,the government needs to identify the true capability of those enterprises and provide effective incentives to make them work hard on low-carbon emission.To solve it,an incentive model considering both moral hazard and adverse selection is constructed by incorporating game theory and incentive mechanism theory under the condition that enterprise's low-carbon technology is continuous.Then the model is solved and compared to the single information asymmetric only with moral hazard,which is verified by numeral simulation.The results show that in dual situation,the expected revenue of government decreases,enterprise's effort level reduces but revenue increases.Government should design different contract menus for the enterprises who possess different low-carbon technology to choose.The menus not only has the function of self-selection screening,but also can induce the enterprises to improve their effort level
范如国, 李玉龙. 信息不对称下企业低碳发展的激励契约设计[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2016(11): 62-69.
Fan Ruguo, Li Yulong. Incentive Contract Design for Enterprise's Low-Carbon Development Under Asymmetric Information. , 2016(11): 62-69.
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