Abstract：In recent years,a large number of listed companies in China uses stock option plan to improve the management efficiency.We find whether the stock option plan can stimulate management working hard or not is related to organization complexity based on mathematical analysis.In the firm whose organization complexity is higher,it has better effect.Moreover,based on the data of listed companies in China,we empirically analyzes the effect of stock option plan and the difference in different degree of organization complexity.The empirical results show that the overall effect of stock option plan is not significance;stock incentive plan is better than the option incentive plan;in high degree of organization complexity firms the stock option plan has better effect
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