Abstract：This paper takes the executive compensation regulation of the central state-owned enterprise in charge at the end of 2014 as the quasi-natural experiment,and uses the micro-data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2017 to systematically evaluate the compensation regulation to the innovation behavior of enterprises through the Double-difference model.The results show that the pay regulation policy significantly promotes the improvement of enterprises innovation,and the above effects are dynamic and sustainable over time.The mechanism test shows that the salary level and salary gap are important channels for the impact of compensation regulation on corporate innovation behavior.This paper demonstrates the innovation effect of “Executive Compensation Regulation”policy on Chinese listed companies from the micro level,which has certain policy reference value for the classified management of state-owned enterprises in the future,expanding the compensation incentive mode of management and stimulating the positive role of ordinary employees in enterprise innovation.
王晓云, 许家云. 薪酬管制的创新效应——基于 “限薪令”的准自然实验[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2019(12): 48-57.
Wang Xiaoyun, Xu Jiayun. The Innovative Effect of Pay Regulation:A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the “Executive Compensation Regulation”. , 2019(12): 48-57.
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