Evolution of Industrial Generic Technology Diffusion Behavior and Motivation Mechanism
Zheng Yuelong1, 2, Yang Bai2, Wang Lin2
1.Research Center for the Economy of the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China; 2.Enterprise Management Research Center,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China
Abstract：This paper firstly analyzes the diffusion mechanism of Industrial generic technology from the generic technology R&D process perspective.Then,it uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the evolution dynamics of generic technology diffusion behavior.The results are as follows.Generic technology diffusion is the dynamic evolution result of enterprise R&D benefit tradeoff based on whether adopting generic technology or not.The expected revenue increases from generic technology,the losses increase from non-adopting generic technology and the reduction of substitution investment returns is good for generic technology diffusion.The demand coefficient of enterprise,the market prospect coefficient and the increases of income realization probability from generic technology also are good for diffusion.The lower the sharing level of generic technology intellectual property is,the more beneficial is it to diffusion,but the weaker sharing does willingness of supply enterprises hinder diffusion.Both Government finance and knowledge & technology supports are good for diffusion.The effect of knowledge & technology support on the diffusion is positively regulated by technology conversion coefficient.Based on the above conclusions,this paper constructs the motivation mechanism of generic technology diffusion which includes the driving force from government support,the traction power from enterprises adopting and the source force from generic technology supply and market returns.Finally,this paper proposes the policy suggestions to promote generic technology diffusion from the perspective of driving force,traction power and source force.
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