大国博弈视角下中美转基因农产品标识规制策略演化研究

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摘要转基因技术领先国依仗 “生命专利权”武器把转基因粮食作为战略产品, 渐进蚕食转基因技术追赶国的传统口粮类农产品, 重构 “全球农业新秩序”。以大豆为例, 构建转基因农产品技术领先国与追赶国博弈模型, 以差异性标识规制为两国博弈策略, 异质性消费者多寡为博弈双方得益, 刻画中美两国自1996—2018年转基因标识规制策略演变。研究发现, 两国均实施利己的标识规制策略, 但中国强制标识规制并不奏效。为此, 中国应细化转基因产品式样及内容标识规制, 制定合理的补贴及贸易政策, 降低对进口大豆的依赖程度, 避免沦为下一个 “巴西、阿根廷:被大豆劫持的国家”。

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	于文领
	安同良
	胡小丽

关键词 ：大国博弈, 口粮战略, 标识, 规制策略演化, 大豆产业安全

Abstract：The leading countries of genetically modified (GM)technology take GM food as strategic products relying on the life patent weapon, gradually replacing traditional agricultural grain products, and rebuilding the “new global agricultural order”.Taking soybean as an example, this paper builds a game model between leading and catching countries, and uses differential labeling regulation as the game strategy of the two countries.The number of heterogeneous consumers is the benefit of both sides of the game.The changes in the regulation of GM labeling between China and the United States are studied.The study finds that both countries have implemented self-interested labeling regulation strategies, but China's mandatory labeling regulations have not worked.China should refine the GM product style and content labeling regulations, formulate reasonable subsidies and trade policies, reduce dependence on imported soybeans, and avoid becoming the next “Brazil, Argentina:countries hijacked by soybeans”.

Key words： Great power country game Ration strategy Labeling Regulatory strategy evolution Soybean industry safety

收稿日期: 2020-01-02

PACS:

F310

基金资助:国家社科基金重大研究专项 (18VXK002), 中宣部 “万人计划”项目。

作者简介: 于文领(1988-), 男, 河南周口人, 南京大学经济学院博士研究生;研究方向:产业组织理论, 转基因产品标识。

引用本文:

于文领, 安同良, 胡小丽. 大国博弈视角下中美转基因农产品标识规制策略演化研究[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2020(8): 168-176.
Yu Wenling, An Tongliang, Hu Xiaoli. Research on the Evolution Labelling Regulation strategies of Genetically Modified Agricultural Products in China and US from the Perspective of the Game of Great Power Country. , 2020(8): 168-176.

链接本文:

http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/CN/Y2020/I8/168

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