Government R&D Funding Strategy Under Asymmetric Information
Sun Yahui1, Luo Shougui1,2
1. Antai College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China; 2. China Institute for Urban Governance,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China
Abstract：In the process of applying for the government R&D funding,enterprises may send false signals through strategic innovation activities,disguising themselves as enterprises with high innovative ability.It is difficult for the government with information disadvantage to identify the authenticity.Focusing on this adverse selection behavior,this paper constructs a two-stage model including innovation leaders and innovation followers,explores the strategic innovation of enterprises,and proposes two countermeasures of signal screening and differentiated funding.The results show that high R&D funding encourages innovation followers to carry out strategic innovation under incomplete information.In the two countermeasures,signal screening can only limit,but cannot remove the strategic behavior,while differentiated funding completely breaks the conditions for innovation followers to carry out substantive innovation.
孙雅慧, 罗守贵. 非对称信息下的政府研发资助策略[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2021(6): 28-37.
Sun Yahui, Luo Shougui. Government R&D Funding Strategy Under Asymmetric Information. , 2021(6): 28-37.
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