Abstract：From the new perspective of vertical fiscal imbalance,the interpretation of China's technological innovation is not only the key to comprehensively deepen the system reform,but also an important part of promoting the strategic layout of innovation driven development,thereby helping China's high-quality economic development.Therefore,using the provincial panel data of China from 2001 to 2018,this paper analyzes the effect of vertical fiscal imbalance on technological innovation and its mechanism with the help of the spatial Durbin model.The results show that vertical fiscal imbalance not only significantly inhibits the improvement of technological innovation level in a region,but also negatively affects the technological innovation of surrounding regions through spatial spillover effect;“competition for innovation”weakens the negative effect of vertical fiscal imbalance on technological innovation in local and surrounding areas,while intergovernmental fiscal transfers strengthen the negative effect of vertical fiscal imbalance on technological innovation in local and surrounding areas.Therefore,it is necessary to reduce the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance,regulate government competition behavior,and optimize the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system,thereby improving the level of technological innovation.
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