Abstract：Antitrust structuralism has experienced a revival from the rise to silence to neo-structuralism,and its concept of observing and analyzing the market competition situation with the market structure as the core has an important influence on theory and practice.With the development of Internet technology and the rise of platforms,the problem of monopoly in the digital economy has become more and more serious.From the theoretical perspective of structuralism,how monopoly in the digital economy is formed can be introduced from several aspects:the multilateral market provides the possibility of platform monopoly,the network effect and scale effect shape the monopoly platform generation,the lock-in effect raises the entry barrier to the platform market,and the merger effect excludes the threat of platform market competition.At the same time,with the help of structuralist regulatory concept,the digital economy's monopoly problems can be addressed through systems such as clarifying gatekeeper system,implementing interoperability,and improving the concentration of operators so as to promote the adequacy of competition in the digital economy market.
王明泽. 结构主义视角下数字经济垄断分析[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2023(3): 129-139.
Wang Mingze. Analysis of Monopoly in the Digital Economy from a Structuralist Perspective. , 2023(3): 129-139.
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