市场化进程、高管晋升激励与研发投资

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摘要本文以2011—2015年非金融类上市公司为研究样本,就高管晋升激励对企业研发投资的杠杆效应进行了检验。研究发现:内部高管晋升激励与企业研发投资显著负相关;市场化进程对企业内部高管晋升激励与研发投资的负相关关系起加强作用。进一步,基于企业产权性质进行分组回归,在市场化进程水平低的地区,国有企业的高管晋升激励对研发投资的影响更显著;相反在市场化进程水平较高的地区,非国有企业相比于国有企业对两者间的影响弹性更大。研究结论不仅对于深入理解企业的研发投资行为,完善企业内部激励机制具有重要意义,还表明了市场化进程等制度环境在企业创新行为中的作用。

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	朱永明
	贾明娥

关键词 ：市场化进程, 高管晋升激励, 研发投资, 产权性质

Abstract：This paper draws upon the data of Chinese non-financial listed companies from 2011 to 2015 to empirically study the leverage effect of the top managers' promotion incentive on R&D investment.It is found that the top managers' promotion incentive was significantly negative to R&D investment.The marketization process strengthened the negative correlation between the top managers' promotion incentive and R&D investment.Furthermore,with group regression based on the enterprise property rights,in the region of lower marketization progress,the state-owned listed companies showed a higher correlation with the top managers' promotion incentive and R&D investment.Conversely,in the region with higher marketization progress,the non-state-owned listed companies would reduce more R&D investment than the state-owned listed companies.This paper has a great significance on understanding R&D investment behavior and improving the interior incentive mechanism.In addition,it provides the role of institutional environment in the enterprise innovation,such as marketization process.

Key words： Marketization process Top managers' promotion incentive R&D Property right

收稿日期: 2017-06-09

PACS:

F273.1

基金资助:河南省高等学校重点科研项目“风险投资对企业技术创新的影响研究”(18A630055)。

作者简介: 朱永明(1963-),男,河南光山人,郑州大学管理工程学院教授;研究方向:资金运营与企业技术创新。

引用本文:

朱永明, 贾明娥. 市场化进程、高管晋升激励与研发投资[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2018(4): 157-164.
Zhu Yongming, Jia Ming'e. Marketization Process,Top Managers' Promotion Incentive and R&D Investment. , 2018(4): 157-164.

链接本文:

http://www.zgkjlt.org.cn/CN/Y2018/I4/157