Abstract：Patents and technical secret are important methods for protecting innovation and sustaining competitive advantages.Firms often have to choose between patent and secret since they are to some extent paradox referring to a specific innovation.This paper explores how firms protect their innovation in China based on the evolutionary game theory.Then,a model is built on the Netlogo software platform combining the evolutionary game model and Multi-agent modeling method which allows us to implement bounded rationality and interactivities.The simulation is run with different gain parameters and the results are checked by cross-validation.Finally,this paper draws conclusion and puts forwards some suggestions.
赵晓阳. 专利还是技术秘密——基于演化博弈视角的创新保护策略研究[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2019(3): 124-131.
Zhao Xiaoyang. Patents or Technical Secret? A dynamic View Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and Multi-agent Simulation. , 2019(3): 124-131.
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