Fiscal Decentralization,Local Government Competition and Regional Technological Innovation Efficiency
Tian Hongyu1, Zhu Zhiyong2, Hu Xiaoqing3
1.College of Economics and Management,China Three Gorges University,Yichang 443000,China;
2.College of Economics and Management,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715,China;
3.Zhangjiajie College,Jishou University,Zhangjiajie 427000,China
Abstract：Technological innovation is the driving force of social and economic development,fiscal system and local government behavior would affect its development due to its characteristic of public goods.This paper analyzed the influence mechanism of fiscal decentralization,local government competition on regional technological innovation efficiency,and tested the influence based on provincial panel data of China from 1997 to 2016 by using the panel quantile model.The study found that,the fiscal decentralization system was conducive to improving the efficiency of regional technological innovation,and its influence track was inverted as the“U-shaped”;On the contrary,local government competition significantly inhibited the efficiency of regional technological innovation,and its influence track was also inverted as the“U-shaped”;Local government competition weakened the fiscal decentralization positive marginal contribution to the technological innovation efficiency.As a result,their synergistic effect was not conducive to the efficiency of regional technological innovation.In addition,the above effects showed regional heterogeneity,mainly reflected in the role of strength.Therefore,to enhance the level of regional technological innovation,we not only need to deepen and improve the fiscal decentralization system,but also need to regulate the local government's behavior by various institutional norms and incentive mechanisms.
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