1.School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China; 2.School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou 510520,China; 3.Guangzhou College of South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510800,China
Abstract：Based on the perspective of compensation structure,this paper selects the Chinese A-share listed companies that have implemented equity incentives for CEOs in 2009—2017 as research samples,and examines the effect of CEO equity incentive intensity(the ratio of equity incentives to total compensation) on corporate R&D investment,and further analyzes the moderate effect of CEO power.The study finds that:①CEO's equity incentive intensity has a significant inhibitory effect on corporate R&D investment.However,this effect only significant in restricted stocks,but not in stock options.②CEO power can effectively alleviate the inhibitory effect of equity incentive intensity on corporate R&D investment.The findings show that compared with the low-intensity security-based equity incentive plan,the high-intensity performance-based equity incentive plan would damage corporate R&D investment.Therefore,it has certain reference value for the formulation and improvement of equity incentive mechanism for listed companies in China.
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