Innovation Incentives in China's Manufacturing Industry Under the Background of Transformation: Administrative or Economical Incentives——A Comparative Study on China's Listed Enterprises with Different Property Rights in Manufacturing Industry
Wang Ya1, Li Guihua1,2, Li Yuanyuan3, Li Wenhui4
1. School of Business,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China; 2. Binhai College,Nankai University,Tianjin 300270, China; 3. School of Business Administration,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China; 4. Ipsos Marketing Research Group,Chengdu 610093,China
Abstract：Predicated on the panel data of A-share listed companies in China's manufacturing sector from 2013 to 2018,this paper utilizes the perspective of property rights comparison to discuss the influence mechanism of government administrative incentive and enterprise internal economical governance on technological innovation.The results are as follows.Firstly,the governmental subsidy yields significant incentive effect on the technological innovation of non-state-holding enterprises,but no remarkable incentive effect on state-holding enterprises;Secondly,executive incentives display different effects on technological innovation investment of different property rights manufacturing enterprises.To be specific,the equity incentive accommodates a significant promoting effect on the technological innovation of state-holding enterprises,while also yielding a significant restraining effect on non-state-holding enterprises.Moreover,salary incentive has a significant restraining effect on technology innovation of state-holding enterprises,along with a significant promoting effect on non-state-holding enterprises.
王亚, 李桂华, 李园园, 李文辉. 转型背景下中国制造业的创新激励:“行政型”激励还是 “经济型”激励——基于制造业不同产权上市企业的对比研究[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2021(4): 75-84.
Wang Ya, Li Guihua, Li Yuanyuan, Li Wenhui. Innovation Incentives in China's Manufacturing Industry Under the Background of Transformation: Administrative or Economical Incentives——A Comparative Study on China's Listed Enterprises with Different Property Rights in Manufacturing Industry. , 2021(4): 75-84.
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