Financial Decentralization,Government Preference and Enterprise Innovation
Li Enji1, Li Qun2
1. School of Business Administration,Hebei University of Economics and Business,Shijiazhuang 050061,China;
2. Institute of Quantitative & Technical Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China
Abstract:In view of the lack of innovation power of local governments and enterprises in China,this paper examines the influence of decentralization on local government preferences and enterprise innovation from the perspective of decentralization.Firstly,by establishing three-tier game of the central government,local government and enterprise,the mechanism of local government and enterprise innovation activities is explained theoretically.Then the measurement test was carried out by using the a-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen and urban data from 2007 to 2018.The study found the followings.①Fiscal decentralization will significantly affect the formation of local government preferences,and the decentralization of income and expenditure have asymmetric influence on local government investment preferences.The decentralization of fiscal revenue will reduce the investment preference of local governments.Under the decentralization of fiscal expenditure,the local government will have short-term tendency and prefer the short-term investments with obvious economic benefits.②The local government investment preference will inhibit the investment of enterprises,and this inhibition effect is more obvious in state-owned enterprises,associated enterprises and enterprises in region with low marketization level.③The change of official performance appraisal index has an moderating effect on the influence of decentralization on local government preference.The change of official performance appraisal strengthens the inhibition effect of the fiscal revenue decentralization on the investment preference of local government,and weakens the promotion effect of the decentralization of fiscal expenditure on the investment preference of local government.