Abstract：Based on the panel data of China's listed new energy vehicle(NEV)enterprises from 2009 to 2018,the multistage difference-in-difference model is adopted to analyze the difference of the impact of government procurement on the scale expansion and innovative development of NEV enterprises.Simultaneously this paper considers the moderating effects of the political connection and marketization of NEV enterprises.The results show that the government procurement policy promotes the scale expansion and innovative development of NEV enterprises,and its promoting effect on innovative development is greater than that on the scale expansion.Under the circumstances of different political connection and marketization level,the influence of government procurement is different.At the present stage,a high-level political connection negatively regulates the influence of government procurement on the scale expansion of NEV enterprises,while a high marketization level positively regulates the influence of government procurement on the scale expansion and innovative development of NEV enterprises.Therefore,it is necessary to further implement the government procurement policy for NEVs and strengthen the priority procurement criteria.In addition,it needs to fully guarantee the openness and transparency of all aspects of government procurement of NEVs,and to improve the supervision of high politically connected vehicle enterprises.At the same time,it is also necessary to further improve the level of marketization and prevent disruptions brought about by local protection to the fair competition and innovative development of NEV enterprises.
熊勇清, 王俊峰, 秦书锋. 新能源汽车政府采购政策效果分析[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2022(1): 64-72.
Xiong Yongqing, Wang Junfeng, Qin Shufeng. Analysis of the Effect of China's New Energy Vehicle Government Procurement Policy. , 2022(1): 64-72.
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