Abstract：The algorithm shadow bureaucrats with algorithm companies as the main body participate in the construction of digital government,on the one hand,greatly improve the ability of digital government services.on the other hand,they use the advantages of algorithms to bring the government into the black box,posing a threat to the construction of digital government.On the basis of existing research,from the perspective of actor-centered interaction,this study constructs the specific dialogue between theory and reality in the macro-institutional environment and micro-interaction logic,respectively,to explore the interaction patterns and incentives between algorithm shadow bureaucrats and multiple actors of government departments,so as to effectively respond to the simplification and generalization tendency of existing studies on the structure and inducement demonstration of interaction among actors.It is found that the alienation risk of interaction imbalance is embodied in the algorithm black box risk which depends on the inherent principal-agent cooperation relationship and the hidden collusion risk hidden under the administrative deviation caused by the hierarchical coordination mechanism.In essence,this is caused by the governance distance caused by the double dimensions of algorithm black box and system vacuum,which should be resolved from the aspects of laws and regulations,value norms,talent training,supervision and governance,etc.
韩云超. 行动者互动视域下算法影子官僚异化风险[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2024(9): 144-155.
Han Yunchao. The Risk of Algorithm Shadow Bureaucratic Alienation from the Perspective of Actors' Interaction. , 2024(9): 144-155.
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