Abstract：In the context of the great power game,the intellectual property competition with patents as the core has become an important part of the scientific and technological competition between the US and the West against China.To contain and suppress China's innovation and development,western countries led by the US,based on the strategic considerations of national security,economic development,political hegemony and other factors,have implemented multidimensional integrated repression of China's patent field from legislation,administration and justice.The US and the West engage in sensationalized infiltration by creating hot topics such as forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft,co-opt infiltration by allying with Western countries to establish an anti-China front,and induce infiltration by exporting benefits,lobbying and discrediting,thus bringing risks of technology decoupling,international reputation and international trade to China.Based on the signal theory and combined with the signal transmission process of patent suppression and penetration in China,this paper proposes three strategies for China's risk prevention and control of patent suppression and penetration in the US and the West.①Improve the ability of patent checks and balances,and open up a new situation of China-style intellectual property cooperation;②Form a “situational awareness”of patent suppression and penetration,and build a build a Chinese-style signal expression mechanism;③Improve the resilience of the industrial chain and supply chain,and take reciprocal countermeasures.
姜南, 韩琦. 美西方对华专利遏压与渗透:动因、举措与风险防控[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2025(4): 140-150.
Jiang Nan, Han Qi. American and Western Patent Suppression and Penetration in China: Motivation,Measures and Risk Control. , 2025(4): 140-150.
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