Abstract：Using data from listed companies on the SMEs board of China,we classified the family firms and explored the influence effects of family ownership,family control and family involvement on family performance.The results show that family-controlled firms outperform person-controlled firms and non-family firms generally;pyramids structure has no significant effects on firm performance;but family involvement has significant effects which are different according to different family firms
陈家田. 家族企业创业导向与公司业绩——基于中小板上市公司的经验分析[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2015(11): 73-77.
Chen Jiatian. Entrepreneurial Orientation and Firm Performance in Family Business ——An Empirical Analysis Based on the SMEs board of China. , 2015(11): 73-77.
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