Abstract：In technological innovation activities,patent jungle which originates from patent licensing hinder the promotion of technological innovation and application process.This phenomenon is called tragedy of the anti-commons,which can be mitigated through the formation of patent pools or implementation of vertical integration.Formation of patent pool,vertical integration or other forms of integration is a Pareto improvement in the cumulative innovation of complementary,but the combination of patents and production companies as a business is the most efficient market results.An important obstacle to the realization of this result is the game between the patent holders,which forms a cooperative dilemma of patent licensing.When the high R&D efficiency potential competitors exist outside of upstream patents,the game between the original patent,patent developers and manufacturer will break the plight of the cooperation,which is conducive to the realization of efficient market outcomes.This provides ideas for public sector in regulatory policy.Public sector can provide various forms of support for the potential entrants to the upstream patents,the purpose of that is to improve the development efficiency of potential entrants
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