Abstract：The paper used the basic theory of evolutionary game and research paradigm.Based on the perspective of transferred industry type,it analyzed“transferring-bearing”behavior on clustered transfer firms and the recipient governments from theory and case.The results show that evolutionary equilibrium of low output-low profit industry clustered transfer is {don't move,don't accept};Evolutionary equilibrium of high output-high profit industry clustered transfer is { move,accept};Evolutionary equilibrium of low output-high profit industry clustered transfer is { move,don't accept };Industrial clustered transfer for high output-low profit,if a good cooperation mechanism between clustered transfer firms and the recipient governments could be built,evolution can prompt equilibrium from {don't move,don't accept} to { move,accept}
胡黎明, 赵瑞霞. 集群式转移企业与承接地政府转-承行为的演化博弈研究[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2016(11): 55-61.
Hu Liming, Zhao Ruixia. Evolutionary Game of Transferring-Bearing Behavior on Clustered Transfer Firms and the Recipient Governments. , 2016(11): 55-61.
2016, 
