Regional Characteristics,Policy Construction and Equity Incentive——Based on Chang-Zhu-Tan Independent Innovation Demonstration Zone High-Level Personnel Equity Incentive Policy
Dong Shitao,Liu Yang
School of Public Administration,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105,China
Abstract：Regional characteristics,construction of policy and entrepreneurial incentive have intrinsic link.The target range,incentive methods and conditions,incentive plan formulation process of Chang-Zhu-Tan National Independent Innovation Demonstration Zone equity incentive policy for enterprises is similar to the rest of the domestic independent innovation demonstration zone.But in the parent company,some policies for the director have the new breakthrough.The director can participate subsidiary equity incentive.Reward share resources and limit.the transfer of land value-added profits are not included in net asset value.The policy of intellectual property rights and scientific and technological achievements into shares also has new breakthrough.The high level talents of Chang-Zhu-Tan's equity incentive policies have many shortcomings.Therefore,we must perfect the high-tech enterprises identification,adjust the excitation amplitude and excitation assessment criteria,set the incentive period,clear incentive object and the establishment of equity incentive funds,strengthen the supervision of equity incentive for the improvement of relevant policies.
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