Abstract：Affected by the regional economic development incentives,local governments may be captured by the polluting enterprises and loosen regulation, which have been proved by former empirical studies.According to the theoretical modeling,this study first analyzes the factors that influence regulatory capture,and their direction theoretically.The study finds that the stronger the government's economic development desires for,the larger the scale of enterprises is,the lower the pollution emission is,the worse the pollution control consciousness of the residents is,the more likely the regulatory capture happens.Contrary to existing pessimistic conclusion that regulatory capacity building is negatively correlated with regulatory profit,this paper further proves that there are positive feedbacks in the construction of regulatory capacity after overcoming the regulatory capture based on dynamic studies,which provides a positive theoretical support for government's public administration practices.Moreover,diversification of governance subjects is the footstone of civil society movement.NGOs play a part most actively in ecological governance and environmental protection areas,but studies related to their contribution in environmental management are rarely published.This paper proves the contribution of NGOs in environmental regulation through the model identification of pollution emission and pollution“consumption”, which provides a theoretical basis for regulatory reform
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