Abstract：Recently,some heated debates are held among academic experts and policy makers about the effectiveness,advantages and disadvantages of industrial policy.However,only if the discussions are put in specific economic-social backgrounds and the concrete contexts of policy making and implementations,can they bring us implications.The Chinese government has used selective industrial policies to encourage the development of new energy vehicle industry since 2009,which is a fresh case for these kinds of policy debates.Using a series of industrial policies with strong selectivity,the national policy makers has shaped the technological choices and market path.This study reflects that in the domain of pure passenger electric vehicle,which is a key subdivision of the new-energy vehicle,the path supported by the policies did not get recognized by the market until it went through a tortuous process,while the path constrained by governments unexpectedly expanded,which were caused by two reasons.Firstly,more capital could not shorten the period of technology improvement effectively.The performance standard set by the governments was too high for the whole industry during the initial stage,which might induce or force firms to sacrifice the economy of the product to satisfy the request from the governments.Secondly,the discrimination caused by policies created an implementation void without constraints of the governments,which accepted the technical and economic characteristics different from the traditional technology on one hand and resulted in the disorder of market on the other hand
薛 澜, 蒋凌飞. 纯电动乘用车选择性产业政策成效分析——对产业政策制定与执行的启示[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2017(10): 80-87.
Xue Lan, Jiang Lingfei. The Effect and Implication of Chinese Industrial Policies on the Pure Electric Passenger Vehicle. , 2017(10): 80-87.
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